In a repeated zero-sum two-person game with incomplete information on both sides, the asymptotic value is defined as v = lim_oo v", where vn is the value of the game with n repetitions. It is shown here that v may be a transcendental number even for games in which all parameters defining the game are rational. This is in contrast to the situation in stochastic games where by the result of Bewley-Kohlberg [2] v is algebraic. This indicates a fundamental difference between stochastic games and repeated games with incomplete information.
1. Introduction. Stochastic games are repeated games in which the payoff functions at each repetition may change according to the state in which the game is found. The current state of the game is known to all players and the transition probabilities between states from one repetition to the next one are determined by the moves of the players at that repetition (in a way known to all players).
Repeated games with incomplete information are also games in which the payoff functions depend on the state of nature which may be one of a given set of states. However, unlike in stochastic games, the state of nature, and hence the payoff function is unknown to the players but it is the same for all repetitions of the game. It is chosen at the very beginning of the game according to a prescribed probability distribution, and from that point on no transition to another state of nature takes place. The main issue in these games is the fact that each player is uncertain about the real state of nature, about which he has only partial information. This information is revised after each repetition as each player observes (directly or indirectly) the behaviour of the other players, that may reveal some of their knowledge about the real state of nature.
For repeated zero-sum two-person games vn denotes the value of the game consisting of n repetitions in which the payoff function is defined as the average payoff per repetition. The asymptotic value of the game is defined as v = limn-oo vn, if this limit exists. The existence of v for stochastic games with a finite number of states was proved in [2]. The existence of v for various classes of repeated games with incomplete information was proved in [1] , [3] and [4] .
A special feature of the Bewley-Kohlberg proof [2] is that it is algebraic. In particular if the parameters of the game (i.e., payoffs and probabilities) are all rational numbers, then v is a vector all of whose coordinates are algebraic numbers. Here we show that this is not true for repeated games with incomplete informationconstructing an actual example of a rational game with transcendental asymptotic value.
We are grateful to one of the referees for detecting an error in Note that although the computation of v is not straightforward, once it is given, it is not too difficult to verify that it satisfies equations (i) and (ii) and, since these equations have a unique solution (see [4] ), one has a relatively easy verification that this is in fact the asymptotic value. As we mentioned before Cav Vex u and Vex Cav u have a special significance; these are respectively the Maxmin and the Minmax of the infinite game.
We first compute those bounds. The computation is rather straightforward and the results are given in Figure 3 A proof of this last proposition can be found in [6] . In particular this proposition implies that av/aq is continuous across the line p = f(q). By (1) and (2) this condition yields the differential equation:
(1-2q)f'+4f2=0.
(3)
